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Abstract 
Banks use internal models to optimize risk weights and better account for the specific risk of each asset class. 
As the choice of a set of risk weights directly amounts to affecting the regulatory capital ratio, economic 
theory suggests that banks should optimize their risk weights also with respect to the cost and benefit of 
holding equity capital. Banks with a higher cost of capital, and banks with better growth opportunities, 
should be more aggressive in reducing risk weights. We consider a large panel of international banks and 
find that, after controlling for a number of bank and country characteristics, banks do respond to the cost and 
benefit of holding capital when selecting their average risk weights. We also find that banks that are more 
aggressive in terms of such optimization have a subsequent lower return on equity and are more likely to 
have raised capital during the credit crisis. 
 3
1. Introduction1 
 
Regulators have recently pushed for better capitalized international banks, especially after 
the credit crisis. As a result, banks like to show capital strength, particularly from the point of view 
of regulatory capital. Economic theory offers conflicting predictions about the relation between 
bank capital and value. In the standard Modigliani-Miller world there is no relation between the 
two, but agency costs may produce a negative relation, see e.g. Stulz (1990) and Diamond and 
Rajan (2001). However, Mehran and Thakor (2010) claims there is a positive relation between 
capital and value, and Allen et al. (2011) show that banks may use costly capital to commit to asset 
monitoring. 
Risk-based capital regulation sets a minimum ratio between capital and risk-weighted assets. 
In the original version of the Basel regulation, so called Basel I, weights are imposed externally by 
the regulator. By definition, the resulting capital ratio cannot account for cross-bank heterogeneity 
and country characteristics. In the Basel II regulation, banks are given the possibility to choose their 
own weights by means of internal risk models, subject to a positive judgment on the part of national 
regulation authorities. Internal models should define weights purely on risk measurement 
considerations, i.e. the internal weights should be set to the level that best reflects the intrinsic 
riskiness of a given asset.  
However, it is well known that, especially due to tax reasons, equity capital is the most 
expensive source of financing for banks. This opens the possibility that banks set their risk weights  
with the purpose of reducing the quantity of capital that is needed to support a given level and 
structure of total assets (so called risk weight optimization). A favourable set of weights would 
reduce the total amount of risk-weighted assets (RWA), making existing (equity and hybrid) capital 
more likely to comply with a regulation that is set in terms of the ratio between capital and RWA. 
We expect that the higher the cost of equity capital, the more serious the efforts of banks to 
optimize risk weights. As data on weights are not publicly available, in most of our empirical work 
                                                 
1
 The opinions expressed here are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views of the affiliated  
Institutions. 
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we proxy risk weights with the ratio between RWA and total assets (so called density). We use 
panel data on a sample of large international banks to test whether the cost of equity capital is 
relevant to affect the density. While the null hypothesis is that the cost of equity has no effects on 
the density, our alternative hypothesis is that there is an inverse relation between the cost of equity 
and the density. 
 There are several reasons why this question is relevant. First, banks should not let the cost of 
equity capital drive the density to a level that does not properly account for risk. The density should 
be set at a level that is right for the true risk associated with the bank, in such a way as to achieve a 
level of equity capital that allows banks to be safe with respect to negative shocks. Evidence 
showing that the cost of equity affects the density raises the possibility that banks artificially inflate 
their capital ratios. Second, if density depends on the cost of equity capital, then there is a 
possibility that the playing field is not level at all, both nationally and internationally. As the euro-
crisis has shown, there are well known effects of country characteristics on the public cost of 
funding, that pass through at the bank level as the cost of equity capital depends on long term 
government rates. Any heterogeneity in the cost of public funding across countries then translates 
into heterogeneity in the cost of equity capital for banks belonging to different countries, and this in 
turn affects the density. Unfortunately the final impact would go the wrong way: banks located in 
countries with a higher cost of funding would optimize their RWA to a larger extent, artificially 
inflating their capital ratios and ending up as less resilient to external shocks. The implication is that 
two banks with similar total assets and asset structures and that are similar in all characteristics 
except in their domestic country would have the same capital ratio but different ratios between 
equity and assets, with the bank located in the riskier country showing a higher leverage. 
There is a growing literature on RWA, largely based on descriptive analyses. Using 
available Pillar III information, Keefe, Bruyette and Woods (2011) argues that there are large 
differences in risk weights across European banks, with weights on residential mortgages ranging 
from 6% to 30% and corporate risk weights going from 27% to 85%. Cannata, Casellina and Guidi 
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(2012) focuses on credit risk and shows that a large part of interbank dispersion across Italian banks 
is explained by the business models and by the use of internal-rating based (IRB) approach versus 
the Standardised approach. Mediobanca (2012) studies 25 European banks and claims that the loan-
book mix and different business models hardly explain the key differences in asset intensity, that 
are instead mainly due to the different mix between IRB and Standardised. Barclays (2012) 
documents the existence of bank-level large temporal variations across time for most banks in its 
sample. Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) look at a sample of 50 systemically important banks from 
Asia Pacific, Europe and North America, documenting wide international heterogeneities in 
densities, with a negative trend over the recent period that may have been due to factors like the 
progressive application of internal models, changes in business mix, the business cycle. They show 
that RWA densities of European banks tend to be lower than those of Asian and North American 
banks and that retail banks tend to have higher densities than universal banks and investment banks. 
They also notice that the characteristics of banks’ portfolios are important determinants of RWAs. 
Das and Sy (2012) look at the relation between RWA and market measure of bank’s riskiness and 
find a positive relation in 2004-2006 but not during the credit crisis of 2007-2008. 
Our paper differs from this literature. First, we do not simply describe differences across 
banks but use economic theory to formulate hypotheses that are tested on the basis of econometric 
models. We try to better understand the meaning of risk weight optimization and highlight a key 
element, the cost of equity capital, that could drive it. Second, our sample, represented by an 
unbalanced panel data of 548 banks from 45 countries over the period 2005-2011, is much larger 
than the ones considered in other papers, and can reveal differences across banks and across time, 
using the signals arising from several world countries that differ significantly in terms of economic 
and institutional environments. Third, our econometric methodology looks at a wide variety of 
estimation models, including a GMM estimation in a dynamic panel framework to account for 
endogeneity. Fourth, we consider a wide range of bank and country characteristics that have been 
highlighted by researchers as potential drivers of heterogeneity in risk weights. Fifth, we also 
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collect information for a large subset of 86 banks reporting the share of exposure at default (EAD) 
subject to internal rating models in their Pillar III annual reports (for the year 2008-2011) and 
produce Tobit estimation where the dependent variable is the percentage of credit EAD examined 
by banks by means of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA).  
Our empirical analysis  shows that the cost of equity capital is indeed a significant factor in 
explaining RWA optimization on the part of banks: the larger the cost of capital the lower the RWA 
density. We  also find that the better are growth opportunities the more intense is risk weight 
optimization, as banks try to build up excess capital that may be used to finance future growth. 
Other factors work as expected: more traditional business models are characterized by higher risk 
weights, larger banks optimize more strongly, expected default frequency of the corporate sector is 
associated with larger risk weights, banks located in countries with better creditor rights also show 
larger risk weights. Most of the results are robust to using as a dependent variable the ratio between 
risk-weighted assets and assets or the share of credit exposure described by internal models. In an 
attempt to understand the general implications of this optimization activity, we find that banks that 
are characterized by more intense optimization have lower return on equity and have raised more 
capital during the credit crisis.  
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes RWA optimization and discusses 
the main hypotheses to be tested in the empirical work; section 3 describes the data, section 4 
presents the results of the empirical analysis, based on both a static panel methodology and a 
dynamic GMM system. Section 5 presents robustness and further insights about the consequence of 
RWA optimization, while section 6 concludes.  
 
2. RWA density optimization  
Banks face a capital dilemma. From the stability perspective, they need to have as high a 
capital  as possible to be able to absorb losses (and  thus increase the distance to default). However,  
from the performance perspective, they also need to realize an acceptable rate of return on capital, 
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that can be more easily achieved through leverage and the reduction of the ratio between equity 
capital and total assets. In order to prevent managers to pursue excessive leverage, and the 
associated level of risk, regulators set a minimum ratio between capital and risk-weighted assets2. 
Under the Basel II approach, regulators leave some flexibility in the determination of risk-weighted 
assets through the so-called internal risk-based models. Under the internal ratings-based approach 
banks can classify their assets in a relatively large number of asset classes. The probability of 
default (PD) is estimated by the bank, whereas the other relevant parameters like the loss given 
default (LGD), exposure-at-default (EAD) and maturity (M) can be provided by the regulator itself 
(Foundation IRB or FIRB) or estimated by banks and validated by supervisors (Advanced IRB or 
AIRB). Unlike in the original Standardised Approach3, in IRB risk weights are continuous function 
of the risk parameters. It follows that banks, particularly those following AIRB, have considerable 
flexibility in measuring assets risk. The purpose of this flexibility lies in the knowledge that 
managers know the specific characteristics of banks better than the regulator, and as a result can use 
their information set to measure risks in a proper way. 
Flexibility also amounts to partially allowing managers to choose how to meet their own 
capital requirements: by reducing weights applied to assets, they can increase the current ratio 
between capital and RWA. This opens the way to RWA optimization. The bright side of such 
optimization is the possibility to better tune the capital needs to the actual risks run by the banks. 
The dark side is the selection of a level of capital that may be low with respect to the actual risks. A 
bank that is short of regulatory capital may reduce risk weights and become compliant even without 
raising new capital. As a result of risk weight optimization, leverage would be higher than the level 
that would have been associated with a capital increase. RWA optimization is therefore potentially 
                                                 
2
 There is a broad literature, largely associated with the 2008 credit crisis, suggesting that regulation should look at the 
ratio between capital and assets as well as the actual amount of capital in order to force banks to respect the minimum 
levels through capital accumulation rather than asset disposure. See Admati and Hellwig (2013) for a general 
discussion. 
3
 Under the Standardised Approach risk weights depend on the external ratings; the number of risk buckets is small; for 
past-due loans some degree of discretion can be exercised by national authorities in reducing the risk weight according 
to the degree of provisioning of each loan. 
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linked with capital optimization and regulatory capital reduction. Our hypothesis is that a higher 
cost of equity capital can induce banks to increase leverage and therefore to decrease risk weights. 
A host of other bank-specific and environmental factors, partly highlighted by the existing 
literature, may also affect this optimization process. In what follows, we describe the variables that 
may affect the RWA density and the variables that  may drive the optimization process. The first 
two hypotheses are the core of our paper and testing. The remaining five hypotheses include 
variables, some of which have already been discussed in the literature, that have clear implications 
on the RWA density. Finally, we discuss creditor rights and claim that it may have a theoretical 
unclear impact on the density. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the cost of equity capital the lower the RWA density. 
From a cross sectional point of view, banks with a larger cost of equity capital will optimize 
more. The larger cost of equity capital may be due to a higher systematic risk and/or to country 
factors, like a higher long-term interest rate.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher are growth opportunities the lower the RWA density. 
The relation between expected returns on equity and RWA is affected by growth 
opportunities that may require capital as well as external funds. If bank managers foresee good 
profit opportunities they will try to reduce RWA density in order to have a capital buffer that may 
support more lending.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The larger the size of the bank the lower the RWA density. 
The implementation of Basel II, and the connected development of internal rating based  
models to a wide range of risks and counterparts, has provided flexibility in the assessment of 
RWA. This flexibility may however be achieved only by investing a substantial amount of 
resources in the development of a large and skilled risk management team. The  bank’s decision to 
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move from a standardized to an IRB approach  implies a relevant investment  which is  more easily 
undertaken by larger institutions. (see Hakens and Schnabel (2011) for a theoretical approach on 
this issue). 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Traditional and retail-oriented business models are characterized by higher 
RWA density.   
Since loans carry large risk weights, banks’ portfolio composition may  strongly affect the 
density. There are assets, such as national government bonds, that do not consume economic capital 
(see Cannata et al 2012) while retail activity is more likely to have higher risk weights with huge 
differences across countries.  
 
Hypothesis 5: IFRS-based accounting is characterized by lower RWA density. 
Accounting standard  differences  introduce a bias in the way total assets are computed as 
the netting of derivatives positions is authorized under US GAAP  and not allowed  under IFRS. 
Thus the  off-balance sheet positions would appear “larger” on an IFRS basis. IFRS implementation  
is empirically associated to higher total adjusted assets and consequently  to lower RWA density, 
see Le Leslé and Avramova (2012). 
 
Hypothesis 6: The stricter the supervisory control, the larger the RWA  density. 
Strict supervisory controls may determine prudent behaviour from the management and a 
higher RWA density. Basel II recognizes an important role to supervision in risk assessment as 
approval and validation of IRB models is a key element of  the new capital regime. The positive 
relation can also be due to the evidence that regulatory restrictions increase bank taking incentives 
and thus the investment in  risky assets (Gonzales,2005). 
 
Hypothesis 7: the higher the borrowers’ risk, the larger RWA density. 
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An increase in the average default probability of borrowers implies a revision of bank’s PD 
and thus higher RWA. This  represents  the  potential procyclicality caveat of the Basel Capital 
Accord. So long as rating systems are responsive to changes in borrower default risk, risk weighted 
assets will increase and  consequently capital requirements will tend to increase as an economy falls 
into recession and fall as an economy enters an expansion. (Catarineu-Rabell et al. 2005). 
 
 Hypothesis 8: the index of Creditor Protection has an uncertain impact of the RWA density. 
Stronger creditor rights are associated with increased lending to a wider and potentially 
riskier set of borrowers, see Djankov et al. (2007), higher bank risk taking, as shown empirically by 
Houston et al. (2010), and by lower corporate risk taking, as shown by Acharya et al. (2009). The 
latter is due to risk aversion on the part of the management that tries to decrease the probability of 
distress and may also try to a decrease in the demand for bank credit. The final impact of creditor 
rights on the RWA density depends therefore on which channel is stronger. 
 
3. Data  
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel data set of 548 banks from 45 countries 
over the period 2005-2011 (see the Appendix A  for the list of countries and the number of banks 
per country). The availability of bank specific and country specific variables leads to a sample of 
around 1,000 bank-year observations. A cross-country study is appropriate because variation in 
RWA density across countries is likely to be greater than cross-bank variation within countries. 
Our dependent variable is the ratio between risk weighted asset and total asset (RWTA)4.  
The banks included in our sample have total assets larger than USD 1 billion as of 2010 and must 
have data on risk weighted assets for at least five years5.  
[Insert figure1 around here] 
                                                 
4
 EBA (2013) and Cannata et al. (2012) use the ratio between RWA and EAD as a proxy for the average risk weights. 
We have data on EAD only for a small sub-sample of mainly European banks. 
5We remove observations regarding two banks (Comdirect  and SCBT) where the RWTA were anomalous.  
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Figure 1 displays the variability of the RWA density  across countries, years, and banks. 
Panel A shows the existence of substantial variations across countries and within each country. The 
country mean can be as low as 0.2 and as high as 0.8. Dispersion within each country is also widely 
heterogeneous. Panel B shows the RWTA for each bank across time and suggests that there has 
been a very relevant temporal variability. Panel C shows that, across time, the average RWTA is 
stable at approximately 60%. Figure 1 confirms that it is useful to study the RWA density through a 
large sample of international banks observed through time. The relevant sources of cross-bank, 
cross-country and cross-time variability should provide strong signals to uncover the factors 
determining the RWA density. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the RWTA for the full sample and for the two 
subgroups of countries that adopt or do not adopt Basel II. Summary statistics show that countries 
that do not use Basel II have a RWTA of 70.29%, against 60.53% of banks subscribing to Basel II. 
The t test of the mean difference for the two subsamples rejects  the null of equality of means at any 
probability level. Basel II seems to be a relevant factor in driving the decisions of banks to select 
the RWTA, even though it may only be a proxy for other variables. 
[Insert table 1 around here] 
In our regressions we consider several variables, both at bank and at the country level, to 
minimize the risk of attributing density differences to observable elements of cross-bank 
heterogeneity like those discussed in the literature, see e.g. Cannata et al. (2012, Le Leslé and 
Avramova (2012). The main data source for bank’s characteristics are Bureau van Dijk’s 
Bankscope and bank’s annual reports.  All financial variables are converted into US dollar.  
[Insert table 2 around here] 
Summary statistics of bank-level variables are reported in Table 2, panel A. All the variables 
have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles of their distribution to reduce the influence of 
outliers and potential data errors. Approximately half of the banks in the sample adopt an IFRS 
accounting standard, and more than 60% follow the Basel II regulation. The average annual 
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increase in the loan to asset ratio is only 0.4%, coherently with the slow-down in economic activity 
associated with the credit crisis. The average price-to-book ratio is 1.17 with a median close to 1. 
The average ratio between net interest income and total assets (net interest margin, taken as a proxy 
of the business model) is 3%. The median beta (measured from a market model regression for each 
bank with respect to the correspondent  local  equity index described in Appendix A) is close to 1 
with a substantial standard deviation; such heterogeneity is welcome as our main hypothesis is 
about the relation between the cost of capital and the RWA density. The ratio between equity and 
total assets is 8.34% but goes down to 7.19% when tangible equity is considered. The average 
return on equity is 7.14% with a median of 10.17% and a large standard deviation due to 
observations with low or negative return on equity. Impaired loans are on average 4.37% of gross 
loans. The average tier one ratio is 12.22%. The natural logarithm of the  z-score, which indicates 
the number of standard deviations that a bank’s rate of return on asset has to fall before it becomes 
insolvent see Laeven and Levine (2009), is equal to 3 on average. Average total assets for the banks 
adopting the Basle 2 regime is equal to USD 176 bn. 
Table 2, panel B, provides summary statistics for country level variables, that we gather 
from several databases: the legal origin of the country where the bank’s headquarter is located and 
the degree of creditor rights come from Djankova et al. (2007); the  World Bank ‘‘Doing Business’’ 
provides information regarding the recovery rate in case of insolvency and the strength of legal 
rights; the World Bank Survey on Bank Regulation and Surpervision 2008 and 2012 are used to 
construct the variable Official, measuring the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency; 
the index of financial freedom comes from the Heritage Foundation; finally, the Report to G20 
leaders on Basel III implementation by the Bank of International Settlements (June 2012) and the 
answer 3.1 (part 3 on Capital) of the World Bank Bank Regulation and Surpervisory survey 
(December 2012) are used for constructing the dummy Basel II that provides information on 
whether the country applies the Basel II capital regime. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
We consider both a static approach and a dynamic approach. The static approach models the 
level of the density at each point in time on the basis of variables that are determined in previous 
periods. The dynamic approach includes the lagged level of the density in the specification and 
looks at the contemporaneous impact of the variables on the current density. Both approaches may 
be justified by both the characteristics of the sample of data and the economic theory behind the 
specification.  
 
4.1 A static approach 
In our static approach we explain the RWA density of bank i belonging to country j at time t 
on the basis of variables determined at time t-1 
 
tjitjtitititji CEBMRCCCd ,,1,41,31,21,1,, εββββ ++++= −−−−       (1) 
 
CC is the cost of capital, that we proxy with the beta of the bank (measured in the previous year to 
avoid endogeneity problems) and the long term interest on government bonds. Notice that our 
measure of the cost of capital is time-varying. RC is the benefit of holding capital proxied by the 
price to book  ratio. The previous two variables represent the main interest of our estimation.  
BM represents the business model of the bank, that we proxy with the net interest margin. 
This measure accounts for the difference between traditional relationship banking and transaction 
oriented activities, see also Demiurguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011). We expect this coefficient to be 
positive because regulation implies higher risk weights for commercial banking activities that 
cannot be completely unwind by the application of internal models.6 
CE represents proxies for environmental factors. There are two effects here, one relevant at 
the static level when comparing banks located in different countries, and one relevant at the 
                                                 
6
 We also use the winsorized ratio between total loans and customer deposits, obtaining very similar result in terms of 
relevance of  both the business model and the other explicative variables.   
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dynamic level within each country. At the static level, different countries are heterogeneous 
regarding (fixed or slowly changing) institutions, laws and accounting standards that affect 
contracts and creditors rights. At the dynamic level, risk may increase in a country because of a 
specific policy shock so that banks using internal models may be forced to update their PDs to 
account for an increased level of defaults. Moreover a country could have a more oscillating cycle 
(e.g. the USA) while another country (e.g. a European country) may have less volatility 
(compensated by lower average growth) due to differences in labour market flexibility, role of the 
State , degrees of protection of creditors and investors.  
In terms of proxies, we alternatively use fixed country effects and a number of proxy 
variables (see description in Appendix B). The variables that we identify are the following. The first 
is the expected default frequency of the corporate sector (EDF), that may proxy for general riskiness 
of the lending environment. The second is the index of official power (OFF) to measure the impact 
of regulation. The third is a dummy that is equal to one when the country has signed up to Basel II 
(BAS). The accounting standard is represented by a dummy that describes the use of local GAAP or 
IFRS. Finally, to measure the institutional environment we use the index of creditor rights from La 
Porta et al. (1998) that assembles information on reorganization and liquidation procedures, see 
Appendix B for its description. We alternatively  use four  other indexes. The first is a dummy equal 
to one when the legal origin is represented by the common law, that usually is associated with a 
higher loan to asset ratio and a higher degree of legal rights protection (Cole and Turk Ariss 2011).  
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), find  that legal origin explains much of the cross-country variation in 
legal protection of investors. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) and  Djankov et al (2007) 
establish that credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP is higher in 
countries of British legal origin. The second is the strength of legal rights, measuring the 
effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws, obtained from the World Bank Doing Business 
Indicator. The third is the index of Financial Freedom, also used by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2009), that measures the openness of the financial system by looking mainly at the relevance of the 
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public sector and its involvement in the allocation of credit.7 The fourth is the recovery rate which is 
inversely related to the LGD. Recovery procedures, usually considered bank-specific, are strongly 
affected by national practices. These factors play a role in the risk management decisions as 
different recovery track records are  associated with  different risk weights and can modify bank 
officers’ risk aversion.  
Pairwise correlations between bank-level variables (Panel A of Table 3) and country 
variables (Panel B of Table 3) are generally small.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
The results for panel regressions  with fixed effects (year and country) and lagged bank-level 
variables  are shown  in table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 around here ] 
 
Column 1 presents the basic specification; bank’s control variables are added in turn in the 
remaining columns. The results confirm most of our hypotheses. Beta is not significant, but the 
interaction between beta and the Basle dummy is negative and significant in all specifications. To 
judge the economic significance of this coefficient, a two standard deviation increase in the 
interaction BETA*BAS is associated with a reduction in the density of 5.4% that corresponds to a 
RWA saving of approximately USD 5 bn on average. The interpretation is that high-beta banks 
working in the Basle II framework have a lower RWTA, consistent with the hypothesis that 
stronger incentives to save capital lead to more optimization whenever this is allowed by regulation. 
Interestingly, the Basle II dummy variable by itself is not statistically significant. The price-to-
book8 has a negative coefficient: growth opportunities require banks to increase assets; in order to 
avoid raising capital, banks may decide to optimize risk weights more aggressively.  
                                                 
7
 The index has been used to proxy for risk-taking on the part of banks, but Gonzales (2005) has shown that its relation 
with risk-taking is empirically ambiguous. 
8
 We also try the interaction between the variable representing the benefit of capital and the dummy representing the 
jurisdictions adopting Basle2. Given the lack of statistical significance and the lack of space we do not report the 
correspondent specification in table4 but results are available upon request to the authors.. 
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The net income margin is positive, confirming that traditional banking activity  is associated 
to higher risk weights. The accounting dummy is negative, as expected. We also control for other 
bank level variables: the log of total assets, ratio between equity and total assets, the ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans, the log of the Z-score. The log of total assets is always 
significantly negative, as big banks use their risk departments to develop internal rating models. The 
adoption of the IRB approach requires the construction and maintenance of large internal databases, 
the acquisition of expertise necessary to build rating systems for each class of counterparts 
comparable to those available from recognized external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) and 
several accurate validation procedures by the national supervisory body. The ratio of the book value 
of equity to total assets9 is used to evaluate the incentive stemming from the level of capitalization. 
Given the regulators focus on adequate capital ratios we assume that banks with high level of 
capital may have less motivation to pursue RWA optimization policies. Table 4 provides support to 
our interpretation. The  ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, in principle, should boost the 
stock of risk weighted assets as it worsens the risk profile of the loan portfolio. Finally, we control 
for the idiosyncratic risk by including the log of the z-score. Interestingly, the last two control 
variables exert no significant impact on the RWTA density. 
An alternative way to account for country-specific effects is to introduce country level 
variables into equation (1).  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
The basic results regarding bank characteristics are unaffected by the introduction of country 
specific variables, except for the significance of the accounting standard (A) and of the beta 
coefficient (BETA). As to the cost of capital, the overall effect (the sum of the coefficients of 
BETA and BETA*BAS) remains negative for banks belonging to jurisdictions adopting the Basle 2 
framework. The positive relation between BETA and the density for banks not belonging to Basle II 
                                                 
9
 Alternatively we  tried the ratio of tangible equity to total assets, with no difference in results. In the tables we kept the 
EQTA ratio simply to avoid the loss of observations due to a larger number of missing value associated to goodwill and 
other intangibles. 
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may be due to the impact of systematic risk. The lack of such a relation in the previous specification 
may have been due to the presence of fixed country effects absorbing the impact of BETA. Among 
the country level variables the average Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of the national corporate 
sector and the  degree of official monitoring are significant and of the expected sign, as higher 
environmental risk forces the banks to maintain higher risk weights and more severe regulators 
prevent banks from over-optimizing. Creditor rights is positive and significant only when the 
variable Legal rights is also included in the regression (it appears with a negative sign). We have 
already pointed out that their sign could be either negative or positive depending on the relative 
strength of demand and supply channels. As to other proxies of the institutional setting, the 
recovery rate is negative and significant while the index of Common Law and the index of Financial 
Freedom are not significantly different from zero. 
 
4.2 The dynamic model: the system GMM approach 
To allow for potential autocorrelation in RWA’s we estimate a dynamic version of (1):  
 
tjitjtjtitititjitji CEBMRCCCdd ,,,4,3,2,11,,,, εµγββββα +++++++= −     (2) 
 
where
,jγ  and ,tµ  denote sets of country dummies and time effects and tji ,,ε  is the error term  with 
0)(
,,
=tjiE ε  for all ji, and t .10  
Difference GMM estimator  of equation (2)  as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)  is 
based upon the following orthogonality conditions: 
 
0)(
,,,,
=∆
− tjistjidE ε  for Tt ,...,3= and  12 −≤≤ Ts               (3) 
 
                                                 
10
 We can rewrite (2) as 
tjitjtitititjitji uCEBMRCCCdd ,,,4,3,2,11,,,, )1( +++++−=∆ − ββββα   so the 
model can be estimated in levels or first differences.  
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The second and further lags of stjid −,,  are used as instruments for the residual of equation (2) in 
differences. However this estimator suffers from potentially small sample bias  when the number of 
time periods is small  and the dependent variable is persistent, see Alonso –Borrego and Arellano 
(1999). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest the use of System 
Generalized Method of Moment (System GMM) that bypasses the finite sample bias if one assumes 
mild stationarity on the initial conditions of the underlying data generation process. This method 
seems appropriate also for a number of reasons: (i) it controls for the possible problem of reverse 
causality of many of the explicative variables used in the specification, (ii) it does not require a 
distributional assumption on the error term, (iii) it is suitable for a relatively large number of cross-
section observations compared to time series observations. In addition to the moment conditions 
specified in equation (3) system GMM uses the following moment conditions: 
0)((
,,1,, =+∆ − tjijttjidE εδ  for Tt ,...,3=                                            (4) 
 
We use lagged first differences of the dependent variable to construct the orthogonality conditions 
for the error term of equation (3) in level. Additional orthogonality conditions for system GMM 
arise from suitable lags of the lagged explanatory variables in levels which can be treated either as 
exogenous, predetermined or strictly exogenous. The number of instruments tends to increase 
exponentially altering the reliability of results. Thus we follow Roodman (2009) and implement his 
routine to collapse instrument matrix and use only one lag of the dependent variable11. The 
standards errors of panel data estimators also need to be adjusted because each additional time 
period of data is not independent of previous periods. We thus compute robust standard errors and 
treat all bank-level variables as predeterminated. Dummy and country-level variable are treated as 
strictly exogeneous. Table  6 reports one –step system GMM estimates of equation (2)12: 
[Insert Table 6 around here ] 
                                                 
11
 All GMM estimations are carried out using the xtabond2 package in Stata (see Roodman 2009)  
12
 Technically, the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient. However  Monte Carlo studies have shown that the efficiency 
gain is typically small, and that the two-step GMM estimator has the disadvantage of converging to its asymptotic distribution 
relatively slowly. In finite samples, the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM estimators can be seriously 
biased downwards, and thus form an unreliable guide for inference (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 2001). 
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We report three  main tests to determine the appropriateness of our dynamic GMM 
estimations. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the errors, with a null hypothesis 
represented by no autocorrelation in differenced residuals (more specifically, the second-order test 
in first differences for autocorrelation in levels). The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions with 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the 
instruments are valid. A further test is the Diff-in-Hansen test  for the validity of the additional 
moment restrictions necessary for system GMM given in equation (4). In all cases the Arellano-
Bond test for zero autocorrelation shows that at order 2 there is no evidence of serial correlation and  
the p-values  of the Hansen tests do not reject the null hypothesis. In summary our test statistics hint 
at a proper specification.   
Table 6 reports six regressions of the RWA density. Regressions 2- 6 differs from regression 
1 in that they include a set of country variables. In all regressions, the bank level variables enter 
with the expected sign when significant. Differently from the results in table 4 but in line with those 
of table 5 we find that the variable associated with the cost of capital is significant (at least at 5% 
level) and positive. Again, the coefficient of beta is smaller than the negative coefficient of the 
interaction between Beta and Basle II, but the composite effect seems small. Contrary to results 
presented in table 5, the dummy variable Basle II (here treated as purely exogenous) is positive and 
statistically significant. Finally, the estimates confirm the relevance of the selected country-level 
variables. In particular, EDF, Official and Creditor rights show a positive impact on the RWA 
density. Moreover, the proxies for risk taking, whose signs are theoretically ambiguous, turn out to 
be significant and positive, suggesting that more advanced institutional frameworks lead to lower 
degrees of risk aversion of bank’s managers. Changes in sign and significance for some of the 
regressors are not uncommon when moving from a static to a dynamic approach (see Soto 2010)  
and this could be due to the fact that panel OLS does not account for persistence of the data 
generation process. 
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5. Robustness and further insights 
5.1 Robustness 
Table 7 presents the parameter estimates obtained substituting PB with two alternative 
measures of business opportunities, the return on average equity (ROAE)  - column (1) and (2)- and 
the future growth of loans DLOTAF, in columns (3) and (4). 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 Ordinary panel data analysis cannot cope with the endogeneity  problem due to the use of the future 
value of the percentage change of gross loans, thus we  implement a panel IV  GMM  regression, 
where the instruments are the first two lags13 of the same variable. Column (1) and (3) show 
specifications without control variables which are instead accounted for in column (2) and (4). The 
statistical significance and sign of the relevant explicative variables holds as in table 4. 
The results in table 4 and 7 are robust to the replacement of  EQTA, with the ratio between 
Tangible Equity and total assets, with the T1ratio, and to additional control variables such as 
Fragility. To account for macro cyclical conditions we also include in the regressions  the GDP 
growth, and the ratio between public debt and GDP. Furthermore we run a number of additional 
regressions where we iteratively include a wide range of country-level variables  representing 
regulatory, governance and financial structure variables that have been examined by other 
researchers as a proxy of the risk taking attitude of bankers.14 Most of these variables are highly 
correlated and cannot be included in a single model. Among the regulatory variables15 we consider 
Capital (an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital), Monitor (an index that measures the 
degree to which regulations empower, facilitate, and encourage the private sector to monitor banks) 
and an index of Deposit Insurance.  
We also take into account additional governance variables including Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption from the World Bank’s Governance indicators, the Corruption Perception 
                                                 
13
 Higher lags were not statistically significant. 
14
 For parsimony results are not reported  in the tables. 
15
 Regulatory variables derive from Barth et al.(2008) and  are constructed  on data fromWorld Bank’s Bank Regulation 
Survey 2008 and 2012 
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index from Transparency International along the line of  Beck et al. (2006) who find a positive 
relation between bank officer’s corruption and biased lending policies that can only partially be 
mitigated by supervisors. In addition we check for the relevance of financial market development 
by including the natural logarithm of the sum of Private Credit and Market Capitalization divided 
by GDP, the ratio between (Demand, Time and Saving) deposits and GDP and  the banking sector’s 
default risk (z-score), whose values are taken from Beck et al.(2009).16  Finally we test for the 
significance of two measures of Bank Concentration - respectively the assets of the three and the 
five largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets17- as risk taking 
incentive for banks are usually higher as their markets become more concentrated (e.g. Boyd et al. 
2005). None of these variables is significant when added to our model and our main results are not 
affected.  
 
5.2 Internal Rating Models and RWA 
As part of the robustness analysis, in this section we study the relation between bank 
characteristics and internal risk models for a subset of banks in our sample. Here we focus on the 
percentage of credit EAD modelled by banks through internal models (we call such a variable 
IRBA). IRBA has two advantages: first it is a direct result of the efforts of banks to use internal 
models and second it is limited to credit risk and does not also include other sources of risk (e.g. 
market risk and operational risk) that may affect the density. We are able to measure the variable 
from the Pillar III reports of 86 international banks located in countries adopting Basle II. 
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
The results in panel A, with IRBA as the dependent variable, are consistent with our 
previous findings and confirm the importance of the bank-level explanatory variables used in the 
analysis. Signs are as expected and are reversed with respect to the ones reported in table 4, 
coherently with the definition of the new dependent variable.  
                                                 
16
 On data from the World Bank’s Financial Structure database  September 2012.  
17
 Source the World Bank’s Global Financial Development database 2012. 
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In table 8, panel B, we show the panel estimation with fixed country and year effects  
explaining the RWTA for the subgroup of 86 banks on the basis of bank-level explanatory variables 
and the percentage of EAD weighted via internal rating models. Results are as expected. A larger 
share of EAD evaluated with internal rating models is associated with a lower RWA density. All the 
remaining variables keep the statistical significance and sign as in the previous analyses. 
 
5.3 RWA optimization and banks’ resilience 
Finally we ask whether a reduction of RWA via optimization has affected bank’s resilience 
and performance during the recent bank crisis. The estimates of equation 3 in table 4 are used to 
compute a measure of the reduction in RWTA due to bank’s cost of capital, i.e. our RWA 
optimization proxy. Using the property that - in a linear regression - the average value of the 
dependent variable is the sum of the estimated coefficient multiplied by the average of the 
correspondent explicative variables (including the constant), we compute  the level importance 
(Achen 1982 p.72) to obtain the average amount of RWTA density reduction via optimisation  
actions under the Basle 2 framework. The average amount of optimisation turns out to be around 
6% of bank RWTA18.   
The same idea may be applied to derive a proxy for each bank-year observation (BETA 
OPT) which represents the reduction of RWTA due to optimization (high degrees of  optimization 
corresponding to large positive values).   
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
Panel A in Table 9 shows the estimates of a panel OLS where the dependent variable 
(ROAE) is regressed against BETA OPT and other control variables. In all cases, over the full 
sample and during times of crisis, the RWA optimization produces a negative effect on bank’s 
performance. This result could be due to a biased valuation of risks that alters the profitability 
prospects and is robust to the introduction of bank’s level control variables, including the cost of 
                                                 
18
 This is obtained by the product of (0.0422) –see column 3 Table 4- by the average value of  beta*bas ( 0.97) divided 
by the average RWTA (0.64)   
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capital BETA (see equation 3 in Table 9). This finding is preliminary but holds true also when we 
consider as dependent variable the ratio between net income and total assets19. Despite the need for 
further analyses, this suggests that risk weight optimization have a null short run impact of 
profitability. 
In Panel B, a Probit model - over the sample period 2007-2009, corresponding to the credit 
crisis – provides estimates of the effect of BETA OPT and other bank-control variables on the 
likelihood of an increase of equity capital. The dependent variable is a dummy named CAPITAL 
INCREASE that is equal to 1 when the number of shares in the year changes at least by 10%. The 
proxy BETAOPT affects the capital increase outcome with a positive sign. This means that the 
higher the level of RWA optimization the higher the likelihood of capital increases during time of 
distress. IMPLGL is always significant with a positive sign, which can be reasonably associated to a 
worsening of bank’s resilience to shocks due to a deterioration of the loan portfolio. The relevance 
of the proxy of RWA optimization and of the share of impaired loans is also detected by the 
margins20 computed at the mean level. All the remaining control variables do not display any 
statistical significance.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
We show that the cost of equity capital is a relevant factor in risk weights optimization. This 
holds under several econometric specifications, and considering several bank and country 
characteristics that are believed to represent objective sources of heterogeneity in the choice of risk 
weights. Our findings open the possibility that the international playing field is not level which may 
be an unintended consequence of the flexibility allowed by regulators to use the large information 
sets locally available to banks in order to better determine their risks. Moreover, it also raises the 
question of whether stock market investors understand the result of this optimization process. If the 
                                                 
19
 Estimates are not reported  here for parsimony but are available upon request to the authors. 
20
 The margins are the  estimates of the marginal probability effects of the explanatory variables . 
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available public information does not allow them to understand it, then questions should be raised 
about the effectiveness of the current disclosure arrangements. On the other hand, if investors do 
account for different risk weights, then stock prices may incorporate the possibility that bank capital 
is less than what one would deduce from the official tier one ratio. This would imply that studies 
regarding capital in banking would better use a measure of tangible equity rather than the tier one 
ratio. 
The ultimate impact of the risk weighting system on banks and the economy at large is a 
fascinating topic. The risk weighting system may well affect business choices of banks, for example 
by inducing them to over-invest in low-risk weight assets like real estate and government debt. If 
there are macroeconomic crises associated with the emergence of unforeseen risks in the assets the 
banks have over-invested into, then there is potentially negative relation between indicators of risk 
that are set by the regulators and the riskiness of banks. This negative relation could be due to errors 
in determining risk weights, e.g. regulators suffering from behavioural biases and not looking at the 
long run experience revealed by the data, and/or new risks exogenously appearing in ways that are 
unrelated to historical experience, and/or to an endogenous mechanism by which low risk weights 
allow excess capital to flow into a sector and as a consequence relax discipline among agents in that 
sector and finally build up risks. In this paper we do not consider such links and limit ourselves to 
understanding whether the system may have unintended consequences on the management of 
banks. We raise the possibility that RWA optimization may be bad for profits and may induce 
banks to work with too little capital in normal times and may force banks to raise capital in bad 
times. However, these results are only suggestive of further studies that should see RWA 
optimization as part of a bigger picture that also looks at macroeconomic instability. 
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Appendix A: Distribution of banks by country and correspondent local equity index 
 
This table reports the number of banks per countries, the list of countries and the local equity index used for the 
computation of the variable BETA. 
 
Country 
n. of 
banks Local Equity Index Country 
n. of 
banks Local Equity Index 
ARGENTINA 2 ARGENTINA BURCAP KOREA REP. OF 7 KOREA SE COMPOSITE (KOSPI) 
AUSTRALIA 9 ASX ALL ORDINARIES LUXEMBOURG 1 LUXEMBOURG SE LUXX 
AUSTRIA 7 WIENER BOERSE INDEX (WBI) MALAYSIA 10 
FTSE BURSA MALAYSIA 
KLCI 
BELGIUM 2 BEL 20 MALTA 2 MALTA SE MSE 
BRAZIL 13 BRAZIL BOVESPA MEXICO 4 MEXICO IPC (BOLSA) 
CANADA 8 S&P/TSX COMPOSITE INDEX NETHERLANDS 4 AEX INDEX (AEX) 
CHILE 4 CHILE SANTIAGO SE GENERAL (IGPA) NORWAY 17 OSLO SE OBX 
CHINA-PEOPLE'S REP. 11 SHANGHAI SE A SHARE PHILIPPINES 11 PHILIPPINE SE I(PSEi) 
COLOMBIA 3 COLOMBIA IGBC INDEX POLAND 9 WARSAW GENERAL INDEX 20 
CYPRUS 2 CYPRUS GENERAL PORTUGAL 5 PORTUGAL PSI-20 
CZECH REPUBLIC 1 PRAGUE SE PX ROMANIA 3 ROMANIA BET (L) 
DENMARK 19 OMX COPENHAGEN BMARK (OMXCB) RUSSIAN FEDERATION 14 RUSSIAN MICEX INDEX 
FINLAND 2 OMX HELSINKI (OMXH) SINGAPORE 2 STRAITS TIMES INDEX L 
FRANCE 7 SBF 120 SOUTH AFRICA 4 FTSE/JSE ALL SHARE 
GERMANY 10 DAX 30 PERFORMANCE SPAIN 11 IBEX 35 
GREECE 9 ATHEX COMPOSITE SWEDEN 4 OMX AFFARSVARLDENS GENERAL 
HONG KONG 4 HANG SENG SWITZERLAND 4 SWISS MARKET (SMI) 
INDIA 15 INDIA BSE (100) NATIONAL THAILAND 4 BANGKOK S.E.T. 
INDONESIA 5 IDX COMPOSITE TURKEY 9 ISTANBUL SE NATIONAL 100 
IRELAND 4 IRELAND SE OVERALL (ISEQ) 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 17 ADX GENERAL 
ISRAEL 6 ISRAEL TA 100 UNITED KINGDOM 7 FTSE ALL SHARE 
ITALY 18 FTSE ITALIA ALL SHARE USA 231 S&P 500 COMPOSITE 
JAPAN 7 TOPIX    
n. of  countries       45  n. of banks           548  
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Appendix B: Variables definition and data sources   
This table provides the definition of the  variables used in this study  and their data source. Panel A describes the bank-
level variables and Panel B the country-level variables. 
Acronym Description Source 
PANEL A   
RWTA  Bank’s total risk weighted assets on bank’s total assets Our computation on Bankscope raw data  
A Dummy variable whose value is 1 when the bank adopts the IFRS accounting standard and takes the value 0 otherwise Bankscope 
BETA  Beta estimated at bank-level through a CAPM regression with 
respect to the local equity index 
Our computation on  
Datastream data 
BETA*BAS Product between Beta and Dummy Basle 2 
Our computation 
On Bloomberg  
database and 
Datastream 
BETA OPT Proxy of RWA optimization according to estimates in table 4 (see section 5.3) Our computation 
BAS  
Dummy variable whose value is 1 when the bank’s headquarter 
is located  in a country that  adopts the Basle2 supervisory 
regime and takes the value 0 otherwise 
BIS an 2012 World 
Bank survey on  
Bank regulation 
CAPITAL INCREASE Dummy variable equal to 1 when the number of shares in the year changes at least by 10% and takes the value of 0 otherwise 
Our computation on 
Datastream raw 
data /Thompson 
Reuters   
DLOTAF First difference of the ratio of bank’s total loans to bank’s total 
assets one period ahead  
Our computation on 
Bankscope raw data  
EQTA Ratio of total equity on total assets (in percentage) Our computation on Bankscope raw data 
FRAGILITY 
Deposits from other banks, other deposits and short-term 
borrowing to total deposits plus money market and short-term 
funding, as in Beltratti Stulz (2012) 
 
Our computation on 
Bankscope raw data 
IMPLGL Ratio impaired loans on gross loan (in percentage) 
 
Our computation on 
Bankscope raw data 
IRBA Percentage of credit EAD modeled by banks through internal 
models 
Banks Annual 
Reports 
LGZ 
Z score computed as the average bank return on asset plus bank 
equity to assets ratio scaled by the  standard deviation of return 
on assets over a five-year rolling window. Higher z score 
indicate lower bank risk. We use the natural logarithm of 
zscore because its distribution is highly skewed (in percentage) 
Our computation on 
Bankscope raw data   
LTA Natural log of total assets  Our computation on Bankscope raw data 
LOTA Total bank’s loan to bank’s total assets Our computation on Bankscope raw data 
NIM 
Net interest margin the ratio of the difference between the total 
interest income and cost of – interest expenses related to - the 
funds used for making loans and investments on the average 
interest bearing assets 
Our computation on 
Bankscope raw data 
P/B Bank’s price to book value Bankscope 
ROAE Average return on equity (in percentage) Bankscope  
TEQTA Tangible equity (total equity-goodwill) to total assets Our computation on Bankscope raw data 
T1RATIO Bank’s core capital to total risk weighted assets  Bankscope 
PANEL B   
CREDITOR RIGHTS  
An index aggregating creditor rights. It ranges between 0 and 4 
over the period of 1978– 2003. It is the sum of the four indexes 
that follow: restrictions on reorganization that equals 1 if the 
reorganization procedure imposes restrictions and 0 otherwise; 
no automatic stay that equals 1 if there is no imposition of an 
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny(1998), 
Djankov, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer(2007) 
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automatic stay on the assets upon filing the petition and 
creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition is 
approved and 0 otherwise; secured creditor paid first  that 
equals 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution 
of the proceeds of a bankruptcy as opposed to other creditors 0 
otherwise; no management stay that equals 1 if an official  
appointed by the court or by the creditors, is responsible for the 
operation of the business during reorganization and 0 otherwise 
COMMON LAW Dummy  variable  that takes value 1  when the country has 
common law as legal origin 
Djankov, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer(2007) 
EDF Average expected default frequency of the domestic corporate 
sector (not financial)  
KMV Moody’s 
Database 
FINANCIAL FREEDOM 
An indicator of relative openness of banking & financial 
system. The index ranges in value from 0 (very low) to 100 
(very high). It reflects the government ownership of financial 
institutions, restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open 
branches and subsidiaries, government influence over the 
allocation of credit; government regulations 
Heritage 
Foundation's Index 
of Economic 
Freedom  
 
LEGAL RIGHTS 
The index measures the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders  
and thus facilitate the lending . the index ranges from 0 to 10 
the higher values indicate that these laws are better designed to 
expand access to credit 
World bank Doing 
Business Indicators 
2005-2012 
LT GOV RATE Nominal interest rate on long term Government bond  IMF IFS, various issues 
OFFICIAL 
Index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory 
agency, including the rights of the supervisor to meet with and 
demand information from auditors, to force a bank to change 
the internal organizational structure, to supersede the rights of 
shareholders, and to intervene in a bank 
World Bank Survey 
on  Bank 
Regulation and 
Surpervisory 2008 
and 2012 
RECOVERY 
Cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through 
reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement (foreclosure) 
proceedings. It is a present value based on end-of period 
lending rates from the International Monetary Fund 
World bank Doing 
Business Indicators 
2005-2012  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics RWTA 
This table presents the summary statistics for the dependent variable, defined as the ratio of RWA to total assets, for the 
full sample of banks and for both banks located in countries adopting the Basle 2 framework  and for banks located in 
countries that do not adopt the Basle 2 framework. The number of observation indicates the total number of firm-year 
observations. 
RWTA  obs  mean stdev 
Full sample  2420 0.6458 0.1714 
Subgroup Basle2  1416 0.6053 0.1820 
Subgroup no Basle2  1004 0.7029 0.1361 
  t  value   
t test of different mean in 
subgroups  -15.09   
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the explicative variables. Panel A reports summary statistics for bank 
level variables. Panel B reports summary statistics for the country-level variables. See Appendix B for a detailed 
description.  
Panel A Bank- Level Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 
A  2420 0.5525 1 0.4973 
BETA  1701 0.9598 0.9767 0.4902 
BETA *BAS 1701 0.6178 0.6438 0.5777 
BAS  2420 0.6079 1 0.4883 
DLOTA 2086 0.0038 -0.0033 0.1232 
EQTA 2350 8.3437 7.6331 4.4124 
FRAGILITY 2279 17.1413 11.5194 17.4806 
IMPL/GL 2202 4.3697 3.0115 4.3534 
LGZ 2332 3.1812 3.2128 0.9775 
LOTA 2346 0.6066 0.6342 0.1601 
LTA 2350 16.6580 16.3648 2.1750 
NIM 2350 3.0010 2.8869 1.6823 
P/B 1957 1.1748 0.9870 0.8489 
ROAE 2342 7.1423 10.1750 17.5909 
TEQTA 1995 7.1997 6.5788 3.8864 
T1RATIO 2305 12.2182 11.2000 5.2447 
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Panel B Country-level Variables  
CREDITOR 
RIGHTS  2000 1.6930 1.0000 1.0988 
COMMON LAW 2420 0.4793 0.0000 0.4997 
EDF 1937 0.8083 0.3700 1.7201 
FINANCIAL 
FREEDOM 
2391 64.2283 70.0000 16.8844 
LEGAL RIGHTS 2413 6.9453 8.0000 2.4167 
LT GOV RATE 2175 5.9444 4.0700 6.9862 
OFFICIAL 2369 9.5129 10.0000 1.8924 
RECOVERY 2408 60.5555 75.4000 25.4056 
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Figure 1 Risk Weighted Asset Density 
 
This figure plots the dispersion of  the dependent variable RWTA with respects to banks, countries and years. 
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Table 3. Correlations matrixes 
The table presents pairwise correlations of the variables. The sample consists of banks located in 45 countries across the 2005-2011 time period. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Panel 
A refers to bank-level variables. Panel B refers to country-level variables.  * represents significance at 5% level. 
Panel A A BETA BETA*BAS BAS DLOTA EQTA FRAGILITY IMPLGL LGZ LTA LOTA NIM PB ROAE TEQTA T1RATIO
A 1             
BETA 0.0250    1
BETA*BAS 0.5654* 0.3262* 1
BAS 0.6014* 0.0737* 0.8228* 1
DLOTA 0.1061* 0.0655* 0.1510* 0.1308* 1
EQTA -0.1369* -0.1338* -0.2328* -0.1480* 0.1267* 1
FRAGILITY 0.3225* 0.0824* 0.3381* 0.3123* 0.0336 -0.1266* 1
IMPLGL 0.0554* 0.1096* 0.1263* 0.0765* -0.0583* 0.1057* 0.0338 1
LGZ 0.0631* -0.3284* -0.0163 0.0851* 0.0064 0.0954* -0.0784* -0.3462* 1
LTA 0.3753* 0.3508* 0.5146* 0.3398* 0.0363 -0.3610* 0.3081* -0.1870* 0.0573* 1
LOTA -0.0183 -0.1064* -0.1160* -0.0855* 0.0252 -0.0126 -0.1759* -0.0254 0.0765* -0.2728* 1
NIM -0.3255* -0.0829* -0.4051* -0.3667* 0.0522* 0.5151* -0.2622* 0.2059* -0.0492* -0.4447* 0.1910* 1
PB 0.1525* -0.1305* 0.0484 0.1231* 0.1119* 0.1115* 0.0385 -0.2420* 0.2587* 0.0979* -0.1078* 0.0433 1
ROAE 0.1566* -0.1632* 0.0784* 0.1297* 0.1327* 0.2290* -0.0506* -0.3831* 0.4358* 0.1524* -0.0784* 0.1082* 0.3795* 1
TEQTA -0.1832* -0.1268* -0.2082* -0.1349* 0.1413* 0.9515* -0.1351* 0.1035* 0.0918* -0.4216* -0.0392 0.5390* 0.1126* 0.2359* 1
T1RATIO -0.1956* -0.0509* -0.1849* -0.1325* 0.0643* 0.7117* -0.0344 0.1128* -0.0293 -0.3221* -0.2547* 0.3340* 0.0433 0.1153*    0.7009* 1
 
Panel B
CREDITOR 
RIGHTS 
COMMON 
LAW EDF
FINANCIAL 
FREEDOM 
LEGAL 
RIGHTS
LT GOV 
RATE OFFICIAL RECOVERY 
CREDITOR RIGHTS 1
COMMON LAW 
-0.1524* 1
EDF 0.2594* -0.2178* 1
FINANCIAL FREEDOM 
-0.3363* 0.4130* -0.2445* 1
LEGAL RIGHTS 0.0157 0.6721* -0.2084* 0.6342* 1
LT GOV RATE 
-0.1132* -0.1837* 0.1418* -0.2251* -0.3493* 1
OFFICIAL
-0.2766* 0.2887* -0.2070* 0.2977* 0.2198* 0.2028* 1
RECOVERY 
-0.1696* 0.3652* -0.2669* 0.6879* 0.6200* -0.4948* 0.0728* 1
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Table 4 Baseline RWTA panel OLS estimations with fixed country effects 
 
This table presents estimates from the RWTA regression , where 
tjid ,,  is the RWA density,  i indexes the bank, j indexes the country and t denotes the year. CC is the cost of capital (BETA), RC is 
the benefit of capital (PB), BM is the business model (NIM) and CE are the country effects, here assumed to be fixed. See 
Appendix B for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are used to compute the Student-t.  *** , ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level respectively. All the explicative variables are lagged by one period .  
 
 
main structure Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
NIM 0.0392 8.44 *** 0.0347 7.18 *** 0.0312 6.45 *** 0.0306 6.27 *** 0.0237 4.55 ***
BETA 0.0002 0.02 0.0014 0.15 0.0116 1.15 0.0078 0.75 0.0107 1.01
BETA*BAS -0.0475 -2.92 *** -0.0440 -2.70 *** -0.0422 -2.62 *** -0.0385 -2.40 ** -0.0288 -1.70 *
PB -0.0132 -2.48 ** -0.0145 -2.70 *** -0.0125 -2.28 ** -0.0130 -2.28 ** -0.0098 -1.69 *
ROAE
DLOTAF
A -0.0876 -2.63 *** -0.0840 -2.51 ** -0.0803 -2.55 ** -0.0967 -2.91 *** -0.0575 -1.21
BAS -0.0164 -0.92 -0.0187 -1.11 -0.0109 -0.70 -0.0117 -0.74 0.0812 1.40
control variable
EQTA 0.0057 3.51 *** 0.0054 3.33 *** 0.0056 3.37 *** 0.0057 3.33 ***
LTA -0.0081 -3.26 *** -0.0074 -2.91 *** -0.0064 -2.37 **
LGZ -0.0059 -1.21 -0.0038 -0.75
IMPLGL 0.0006 0.43
CONSTANT 0.8522 20.10 *** 0.7890 17.13 *** 0.9126 16.08 *** 0.9318 16.02 *** 0.7787 12.86 ***
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
obs 1326 1326 1326 1283 1207
R2 adjusted 0.508 0.516 0.521 0.521 0.521
521 3 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tjitjtitititji CEBMRCCCd ,,1,41,31,21,1,, εββββ ++++= −−−−
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tjitjtitititji CEBMRCCCd ,,1,41,31,21,1,, εββββ ++++= −−−−
Table 5 RWTA panel OLS estimations with country-level variables 
 
This table presents estimates from the RWTA regression where 
tjid ,,  is the RWA density,  i indexes the bank,  
j indexes the country and t denotes the year. CC is the cost of capital (BETA), RC is the benefit of capital (PB), BM is the business model (NIM) and CE are the country level variables. See 
Appendix B for variables details. Robust standard errors are used to compute the Student-t.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level respectively. All the 
explicative variables are lagged by one period . 
 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Main structure
NIM 0.0410 7.73 *** 0.0405 7.46 *** 0.0428 7.24 *** 0.0384 6.74 *** 0.0406 7.35 *** 0.0364 6.45 *** 0.0405 7.42 ***
BETA 0.0217 2.09 ** 0.0206 1.98 ** 0.0206 1.98 ** 0.0191 1.81 * 0.0206 1.98 ** 0.0190 1.83 * 0.0208 1.99 **
BETA*BAS
-0.0614 -3.27 *** -0.0749 -3.95 *** -0.0761 -3.98 *** -0.0745 -3.91 *** -0.0751 -3.92 *** -0.0716 -3.82 *** -0.0799 -4.15 ***
PB
-0.0274 -3.99 *** -0.0290 -4.08 *** -0.0293 -4.04 *** -0.0303 -4.27 *** -0.0291 -4.06 *** -0.0273 -3.87 *** -0.0294 -4.10 ***
A 0.0182 1.33 -0.0002 -0.01 -0.0042 -0.26 0.0029 0.19 0.0008 0.05 -0.0186 -1.22 0.0087 0.51
BAS 0.0202 0.86 0.0308 1.18 0.0384 1.43 0.0197 0.74 0.0318 1.16 0.0065 0.24 0.0257 0.93
Control variables 
EQTA 0.0068 3.65 *** 0.0053 2.79 *** 0.0053 2.75 *** 0.0048 2.50 ** 0.0054 2.81 *** 0.0040 2.06 *** 0.0052 2.75 ***
LTA
-0.0123 -4.80 *** -0.0122 -4.61 *** -0.0118 -4.28 *** -0.0122 -4.59 *** -0.0122 -4.57 *** -0.0135 -5.05 *** -0.0123 -4.61 ***
Country variables
EDF 0.0093 2.27 ** 0.0144 3.99 *** 0.0152 4.16 *** 0.0122 3.25 *** 0.0145 4.01 *** 0.0092 2.46 ** 0.0162 4.33 ***
OFFICIAL 0.0097 3.25 *** 0.0105 3.45 *** 0.0106 3.49 *** 0.0103 3.36 *** 0.0106 3.42 *** 0.0075 2.36 ** 0.0104 3.34 ***
CREDITOR  RIGHTS 0.0009 0.19 -0.0003 -0.06 0.0024 0.48 0.0008 0.15 0.0097 1.81 * 0.0007 0.15
LT GOV RATE
-0.0010 -0.76
RECOVERY
-0.0004 -1.72 *
COMMON LAW 0.0020 0.16
LEGAL RIGHTS
-0.0122 -4.24 ***
FINANCIAL FREEDOM 0.0000 0.09
CONSTANT 0.5851 11.22 *** 0.5877 10.75 *** 0.5769 10.05 *** 0.6336 10.74 *** 0.5844 9.74 *** 0.7598 10.48 *** 0.5886 8.73 ***
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 1069 999 984 999 999 999 984
R2  Adj 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.38
n .of country 43 36 36 36 36 36 35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Table 6 RWTA dynamic system GMM  
This table presents estimates from the RWTA regression of the type
tjitjtjtitititjitji CEBMRCCCdd ,,,4,3,2,11,,,, εµγββββα +++++++= − where tjid ,,  is the RWA density, i 
indexes the bank, j indexes the country and t denotes the year. CC is the cost of capital (BETA), RC is the benefit of capital (PB), BM is the business model (NIM) and CE are the country-level 
variables, jγ and tµ  denote sets of country dummies and time effects and tji ,,ε   is the error term . See Appendix B for variables details. One step robust standard errors are used to compute the 
Student-t.  *** , ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level respectively. All instruments are collapsed, all bank-level variable are treated as predetermined; all 
country-level variables are treated as strictly exogenous. 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Main structure
RWTA(t-1) 0.6279 9.64 *** 0.5828 8.40 *** 0.6648 10.84 *** 0.6297 9.12 *** 0.6361 9.25 *** 0.6779 10.91 ***
NIM 0.0275 2.95 *** 0.0321 4.01 *** 0.0315 4.21 *** 0.0287 3.50 *** 0.0296 3.52 *** 0.0311 3.67 ***
BETA 0.0740 4.12 *** 0.0619 2.53 ** 0.0678 2.74 *** 0.0664 2.41 ** 0.0663 2.68 *** -0.0766 -2.06 **
BETA*BAS
-0.0820 -2.87 *** -0.0640 -1.71 * -0.0707 -1.96 ** -0.0671 -1.75 * -0.0671 -1.85 * -0.0782 -2.04 **
PB
-0.0167 -1.75 * -0.0296 -2.79 *** -0.0242 -2.15 ** -0.0318 -2.58 *** -0.0292 -2.46 ** -0.0250 -2.21 **
A 0.0840 1.17 0.0444 2.48 ** 0.0401 2.03 ** 0.0626 2.93 *** 0.0530 2.69 *** 0.0315 1.63
BAS 0.3955 2.48 ** 0.0633 1.40 0.1091 2.32 ** 0.0787 1.75 * 0.0898 2.06 ** 0.1094 2.76 ***
Control variables 
EQTA 0.0058 1.51 0.0055 1.28 0.0076 1.62 0.0052 1.21 0.0058 1.35 0.0070 1.55
LTA
-0.0202 -2.70 *** -0.0090 -2.95 *** -0.0161 -3.48 *** -0.0114 -2.65 *** -0.0139 -3.00 *** -0.0173 -2.91 ***
Country variables
EDF 0.0048 2.08 ** 0.0066 1.85 * 0.0048 2.05 ** 0.0063 1.88 * 0.0061 1.47
OFFICIAL 0.0183 2.71 *** 0.0143 2.70 *** 0.0171 2.83 *** 0.0163 3.24 *** 0.0109 2.66 ***
CREDITOR  RIGHTS 0.0156 2.81 *** 0.0115 1.91 * 0.0112 2.05 ** 0.0081 1.35 0.0129 2.07 **
RECOVERY 0.0010 2.08 **
COMMON LAW 0.0426 1.65 *
LEGAL RIGHTS 0.0086 1.90 *
FINANCIAL FREEDOM 0.0019 2.14 **
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES
SE clustered at country level YES YES YES YES YES
obs 1172 964 964 964 964 949
n instrument 99 57 58 58 58 58
n.group 348 318 318 318 318 314
ratio 3.52 5.58 5.48 5.48 5.48 5.41
AB test AR1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB test AR2 0.14 0.93 0.85 0.75 0.94 0.84
Hansen J pvalue 0.75 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99
Diff in Hansen test of 
exogeneity p value 0.83 0.99 0.67 0.99 0.94 0.96
number of country 45 36 36 36 36 35
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Table 7 Robustness check 
Baseline RWTA panel OLS estimations with fixed country effects with RC proxied alternatively by the ROAE and by the forward 
percentage change of the ratio of loan to total assets (DLOTAF). All variable definitions are in Appendix B. Robust standard 
errors are used to compute the Student-t.  *** , ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level 
respectively. All the explicative variables are lagged by one period . 
 
main structure Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
NIM 0.0277 6.83 *** 0.0266 6.57 *** 0.0263 5.88 *** 0.0262 5.85 ***
BETA 0.0093 0.94 0.0110 1.09 0.0274 2.34 ** 0.0255 2.05 **
BETA*BAS -0.0307 -1.99 ** -0.0298 -1.95 * -0.0471 -2.29 ** -0.0455 -2.24 **
ROAE -0.0005 -1.97 ** -0.0005 -1.78 *
DLOTAF -0.4700 -2.53 ** -0.4584 -2.44 **
A -0.0744 -2.88 *** -0.0827 -2.99 *** -0.1016 -2.63 *** -0.1018 -2.68 ***
BAS -0.0112 -0.82 -0.0095 -0.70 0.0083 0.49 0.0071 0.41
control variable
EQTA 0.0050 3.67 *** 0.0049 3.58 *** 0.0061 3.69 *** 0.0062 3.77 ***
LTA -0.0074 -3.08 *** -0.0075 -3.07 *** -0.0069 -2.42 ** -0.0068 -2.39 **
LGZ 0.0021 0.43 -0.0023 -0.43
CONSTANT -0.5229 -15.56 *** 0.8934 16.37 *** 0.9249 13.76 *** 0.9318 13.68 ***
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES
obs 1488 1435 969 968
R2 adjusted 0.545 0.544 0.556 0.559
4
PANEL IV GMM
1 2 3
PANEL OLS
 
Table 8. Relevance of the internal rating models 
Panel A presents the Tobit estimates for the percentage of EAD evaluated with internal rating models. Panel B reproduces the 
regressions in table 4 for the sample of 86 banks adding as explicative variable the percentage of  EAD modelled through internal 
models. All variable definitions are in Appendix B. Standard errors are robust and clustered in years. *** , ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level respectively All the explicative variables are lagged by one period. 
Panel A : Tobit regression, dependent variable IRBA Panel  B: Panel OLS , dependent variable RWTA
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
IRBA -0.0806 -4.78 *** -0.0472 -5.36 ***
BETA 0.1979 18.72 *** 0.2061 4.18 *** 0.1914 7.09 *** BETA -0.0499 -4.26 ***
PB 0.1224 2.45 ** 0.1700 3.54 *** PB 0.0219 1.58
NIM -0.0927 -6.6 *** NIM 0.0502 4.76 ***
EQTA -0.0578 -3.5 *** EQTA 0.0127 2.70 ***
LTA -0.0124 -0.6 LTA -0.0482 -7.73 ***
CONSTANT 6E+06 11.76 *** 4E+06 2.82 *** 1.02758 2.04 ** CONSTANT 0.5539 11.8 *** 1.0276 2.04 **
Country fixed 
effects YES YES YES
Country fixed 
effects YES YES
no.country 27 27 26 no.country 27 24
no.obs 263 237 233 no.obs 225 160
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.55 0.60 R2 adj 0.72 0.87
1 2 3 1 2
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Table 9. The impact of RWA optimization on bank’s resilience 
In this table, Panel A presents the panel OLS regression analysis of the return on average equity on the proxy of RWA optimization (BETA OPT) and on other bank-level characteristics both  
over the full sample and in the crisis period. Standard errors are robust and clustered at country level. Panel B shows the estimates of a Probit regression for the likelihood of a CAPITAL 
INCREASE on the proxy of RWA optimization (BETA OPT) and other bank-level variables. Standard error are robust, margins are the estimates of the marginal probability effects of the 
explanatory variables and are computed at the mean level. EQTA is lagged by one period. All the variables are defined in Appendix B. *** , ** and * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10%  level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Panel OLS, dependent variable ROAE 
Coef.   t Coef.   t Coef.   t Coef.   t Coef.   t Coef.   t Coef.   t Coef.   t  Coef t Coef.   t
BETA OPT -36.13 -2.35 ** -96.04 -2.38 ** -55.80 -3.71 *** -107.25 -2.57 *** -25.08 -0.87 -122.27 -5.46 *** -41.99 -2.51 ** -113.67 -2.61 *** -27.40 -1.36 -107.63 -2.63 ***
IMPLGL -1.77 -1.42 -0.53 -1.96 ** -1.73 -1.45 -0.53 -2.09 ** -1.90 -1.45 -0.47 -1.83 * -1.96 -1.52 -0.50 -1.89 *
BETA -9.19 -1.11 3.92 1.06
LTA -1.11 -1.27 0.43 0.80 0.52 0.71 1.10 1.47
EQTA 1.71 1.52 0.65 1.43
CONSTANT -1.44 0.13 12.35 4.94 *** 9.57 2.24 ** 15.76 6.63 *** 16.76 4.37 *** 13.24 4.84 *** 28.36 2.22 ** 8.35 0.88 -14.65 -0.64 -8.07 -0.54
Year fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster 
country YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
no.country 37 32 37 32 37 32 37 32 37 32
no.obs 844 394 771 367 771 367 771 367 771 367
R2 adj 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.14
Full sampleFull sample 2007-2009
3
Full sample 2007-20092007-2009 Full sample 2007-2009 Full sample
1 2 4 5
2007-2009
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Panel B. Probit regression, dependent variable CAPITAL INCREASE sample (2007-2009)  
Coef.  z Coef.  z Coef.  z Coef.  z Coef.  z Coef.  z
BETA OPT 3.78 2.35 ** 5.01 2.92 *** 4.59 2.46 ** 4.58 2.45 ** 4.58 2.43 ** 4.43 2.23 **
margin 0.22 11.87 *** 0.23 11.53 *** 0.23 11.46 *** 0.23 11.46 *** 0.23 11.47 *** 0.23 11.41 ***
IMPLGL 0.04 1.82 * 0.04 1.89 * 0.04 1.86 * 0.04 1.75 * 0.04 1.86 *
margin 0.22 11.33 *** 0.22 11.33 *** 0.22 11.33 *** 0.22 11.34 *** 0.22 11.33 ***
LTA 0.03 0.60 0.03 0.57 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.56
NIM -0.01 -0.13 0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.11
EQTA -0.01 -0.52
RWTA -0.11 -0.15
CONSTANT -1.07 -3.17 *** -1.18 -3.31 *** -1.77 -1.59 -1.73 -1.47 -1.42 -1.11 -1.66 -1.26
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
no.country 37 36 36 36 36 36
no.obs 464 412 412 412 409 412
Prob> chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
4 651 2 3
 
